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This document is a synthesis of a three-year collaborative transdisciplinary action 
research project to improve the long-term governance of local scale wastewater 
services (see website: communitysanitationgovernance.info).
To monitor the impact of this synthesis, we are keen to gather feedback on what 
resonates and what is missing. If you have comments or suggestions, please 
contact us (see the last slide).
Please cite this document as: 
Mitchell C, Ross K, Puspowardoyo P, Wedahuditama F. 2016. Governance of local scale sanitation: Visual Synthesis 
Report for key stakeholders in Indonesia. Prepared by the Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of 
Technology Sydney, as part of the Australian Development Research Award Scheme Project: Effective governance 
for the successful long-term operation of local scale wastewater systems.
Disclaimer:
While all due care and attention has been taken to ensure the accuracy of the material published, UTS/ISF and the 
authors disclaim liability for any loss that may arise from any person acting in reliance upon the contents of this 
document.
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Abbreviations
Acronyms for Indonesian sanitation programs
BUMD Badan Usaha Milik Daerah (Local Government-owned enterprises)
CBO Community based organisation
GOI Government of Indonesia
HH Household
IDR Indonesian rupiah
KSM Kelompok Swadaya Masyarakat (Community-based organisation, CBO)
LG Local government
MCK Mandi, Cuci, Kakus (Public Washing & Sanitation Facilities)
NGO Non-governmental organisation
O+M Operation and maintenance
PERDA Peraturan Daerah (Regional regulations)
SSS Simple sewer system
SANIMAS Sanitasi Berbasis Masyarakat (Community-Based Sanitation)
USDP Urban Sanitation Development Programme
USRI Urban Sanitation and Rural Infrastructure Project, funded by ADB
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DOCUMENT OVERVIEW 
This document has five sections:
1. Introduction to project
2. Project methodology
3. Key research findings
4. Key recommendations
5. Supporting recommendations
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The fundamental outcome of sewage management is to 
separate people from harmful excreta pathogens, and 
protect the environment. 
Increasingly, it also seeks to capture the value: nutrients etc.
Revenue
Fertilizer
Energy 
Compost
Treatment
Reuse
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85%
On‐site Local scale
7.5%
The Indonesia 2019 sanitation coverage target for 
improved access prioritises on-site. 
Centralised
7.5%
Basic access
But local scale is significant. It will service the same number of 
people as centralised systems.
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Our focus is on local scale, which can be called many names. 
 SANIMAS
 DEWATS
 Communal treatment
Treatment
Plant
 Distributed
 Decentralised
 Local scale
The term ‘Local scale’ reminds us that other groups can Operate 
and Manage this scale of service along with, or instead of, 
community. 
8
(Figure: T. Rosenqvist)
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100.000
2019
13.000
2014
Meeting the 2019 target means constructing many more 
local scale systems.
400
2009
Requires
IDR 40T
IDR 5T
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What about operation? 
Whilst some community scale sanitation 
systems work well, many have challenges 
(Eales et al [WSP], 2013)
How do we ensure systems actually function in the long term? 
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Duration May 2013 – June 2016
Funding Australian Aid Development Research Awards Scheme
Contributors: UTS, ISF, BORDA
GoI Partners BAPPENAS (Partnership Agreement)
Methodology Transdisciplinary Participatory Action Research 
Collaborators Local Partner: AKSANSI 
International Partners: BORDA Germany, ODI
Expert Advisors: Kathy Eales, Jeff Moeller, Chris Buckley
Project Details:  Effective governance for the successful 
long-term operation of local scale sanitation systems
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Methodology
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Our mixed method approach includes qualitative and quantitative 
data collection, analysis and synthesis. This involves:
• Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with 
diverse groups including:
• communities and village leaders, 
• local NGOs,
• Government of Indonesia (GOI) and local government (LG) 
staff and leaders, 
• representatives from the main funding programs of local 
scale sanitation systems (GoI and donor), and
• the Jakarta-based national Project Advisory Group 
• Observations during study site visits on Java and South Sulawesi 
(~30),  
• Document and data set reviews and analysis. 
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Our fundamental framework is multi-level governance: 
Day to day activities that ensure system functionality
+
Formal and informal institutional arrangements that help 
or hinder the day to day 
That means our focus was on 
1. What needs attention
2. Who has what responsibilities and how should those 
responsibilities happen in practice
(Kooiman 2003, Kooiman 2008) 14
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Our Global Practice Scan identified ‘what’ needs attention 
for long term success for local scale services.
Functioning 
technology: 
Ensuring the physical 
system delivers the 
service
Sustainable financing: 
Sufficient ongoing 
revenue to cover all 
short and long-term 
operational cost 
elements 
Effective management: 
Accountable and  
equitable administration 
and decision making 
system
Sustaining demand: 
Maintaining effective 
community demand for 
the service over time
(Ross et al, 2014) 15
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Legal 
arrangements: 
What are the legal and 
informal arrangements 
for the Operation 
phase?
Then with partners, we carefully chose 4 areas of inquiry that 
together provide powerful insights and improvements.
Scale and 
distribution of 
costs:
For a range of sanitation 
service delivery models, 
what are the scale and 
distributions of cost? 
Performance 
monitoring: 
What is the volume and 
and quality of available 
data on community-
based sanitation 
performance? 
Management partnerships: 
What are the range of structures and institutional 
arrangements that could deliver the responsibilities for 
managing community-scale systems?
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National
Provincial
Local
NGOs
CBOs
Operators 
Users
Transdisciplinary, 
participatory, action 
research:
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Performance 
monitoring
(Mitchell et al, 2016)
What is the volume and and quality of available data on community-
based sanitation performance? (Oct – Dec 2014)
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Legal 
arrangements:
A. City Case Study: 
Institutional 
arrangement analysis 
to understand limits 
to, and prospects for, 
local scale sanitation 
service
B. Legal review: 
Review 55 docs on: 
• National regulation
• LG regulation
• Ownership outcomes
• LG funding options
• Legal entities for CBOs
(Mason et al, 2015) (Al’Afghani et al, 2016)
What are the informal
arrangements for Operation? (Feb 
– May 2015, with ODI)
What are the formal legal
arrangements for Operation? 
(April – Dec 2015, with CRPG)
19
© 
U
T
S
:
I
S
F
Capital 
investment
Routine 
operations
Intermittent 
maintenance
Asset renewal
Pre-operation Operation
Scale and 
distribution of 
costs:
(time & money)
Data sources: 
- Documents 
- Workshops
(Mitchell et al, 2016)
For a range of sanitation service delivery 
models, what are the scale and distributions 
of cost? (Feb – August 2015)
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Management partnerships: 
What are the range of structures and institutional 
arrangements that could deliver the responsibilities for 
managing community-scale systems?
National
Provincial
Local
NGOs
CBOs
Operators 
SYNTHESIS
Users
(Ross et al, 2016) 21
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Summary of key findings
1. Little monitoring occurs in practice
2. Local scale sanitation service has many challenges in 
practice
3. There are legal, institutional, equity, and normative 
drivers for increased LG participation and responsibility
4. Some LG already provide financial and/or legal support
to local scale sanitation systems, but it is not always 
helpful
5. LG can fund the operation and maintenance phase for 
assets it does not own
6. Several barriers limit LG support
23
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Key findings: 
1. Little monitoring occurs in practice
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The need to monitor effluent is recognised, but is challenging in practice, 
because of e.g.,  lack of funds, uncertainty about responsibility, access to labs 
and the quality of the lab testing. 
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Records are limited and disaggregated. 
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The collective, long-term performance of these systems 
appears to be unknown at both local and national levels.
20% post-
construction 
check
2% had effluent 
data available for 
study
of which, 50‐80% 
met standards.
<1% monitored 
longitudinally.
This box represents 100% of systems funded for installation (n=13,6000)
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80% of systems appear to have had no assessment.
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Components of post 
construction check:
Governance aspects Impacts
Financial 
sustainability
Functioning
technology
Sustaining 
demand
Effective
management
Human 
health
Water 
quality
Funded by: DAK SLBM
(77% of systems)
SANIMAS PU
(11% of systems)
✔ ✔
USRI
(10% of systems)
✔ ✔ ✔
Monitored by : AKSANSI ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Reported in:     NAWASIS ✔ ✔
?
Monitoring primary impacts (human health, water quality) 
and governance aspects does not seem to occur routinely. 
?
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Data suggests average use of local scale systems could be 
about half of system design.
29
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Key Findings:
2. Local scale sanitation service has 
many challenges in practice
30
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Effluent was tested in 2011 (Eales et al). The 
majority of systems were SANIMAS and  92%
met standards (n=99).
Anecdotally, 50% 
compliance,(n=~70) (pers comm).
80% had a BOD <100 mg (n=45).
Available data suggests declining technical performance is 
linked to rapid scale up and weaker capacity building. 
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Independent testing by AKSANSI of a variety 
of systems under different funding sources, 
from 2011 to 2014 showed less than 
60% compliance (n=~300). 
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Cash CashRange (median) Who pays?
Legal documentation for
land security1 IDR 1.5M – 5M community
Acquiring land3 IDR 30M – 150M community or donor (mosque, individual)
CBO notarisation3 IDR 0.6 M community
Pipework, treatment 
system IDR 3M – 16 M (9 M)
1,4 community
HH connection IDR 0.3M – 3 M/hh (1 M/hh) Often users, sometimes program
Cash contributions in construction phase of local scale 
systems are required by GoI from community. Scale of 
contribution varies, but can be significant and prohibitive. 
Sources: 1 AKSANSI members;  2 BEST;  3 Bogor CBO workshop and agencies; 4For SLBM Regular, 4% community contribution
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HHs that are 
lower than the 
treatment plant 
cannot connect
Poor HHs 
cannot 
connect
Program design 
does not pay 
for HH 
connection
Program 
design 
excludes 
pumps Incomplete 
coverage of 
HHs
Effluent is not 
processed in 
the system
Drinking water 
& environment 
contaminationLess system capacity is 
utilised
System does 
not function 
properly
Program design 
does not include 
enough 
socialisation
Less 
demand
Program design has 
one CBO for 
installation and one 
for post-
construction
2nd CBO is 
not 
trained
CBO may lack 
authority in fee 
setting and 
collection 
Challenges in 
collecting fees
Inability 
to raise 
fees
Insufficient 
maintenance funds
Sites chosen on basis 
of land availability or 
affordability
Lack of pathogen or 
health monitoring
[ In this systems diagram the  arrows are to be read as “causes” or “contributes to” ]
Poor performance 
unnoticed
Program design may inadvertently prevent health outcomes. 
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Type Level of 
security
1. Akta tanah
(Land deed)
High
2.    Akta hibah
(Grant act)
Middle
3.    Surat hibah
(Letter & stamp)
Low
4.    Permit for govt land Low
5.    Verbal Low
Communities typically fail to legally secure the land: most 
CBOs have informal letters (surat hibah) at best. 
Reasons include: 
• Cost
• Program design 
• knowledge gap 
• CBO is not a legal 
entity
34
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Treatment 
Plant
Pipes 
may 
leak
Not all 
HH may 
connect
Systems may not 
have enough 
effluent to 
function properly
Contamination still occurs after system construction. 
[ In this systems diagram the  
arrows are to be read as 
“causes” or “contributes to” ]
Effluent may not meet 
standards and be 
released to drinking 
water source
Septic tank may 
not be properly 
disconnected 
after connecting 
to treatment 
plant
Contamination 
/ Pathogen 
removal limited 
Poor 
construction 
or O+M
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CBOs has difficulty managing many important tasks. 
Manageable tasks Challenging tasks
 Flush the system 
 Check pipes for cracks
 Plan and track completed O+M tasks
 Fix blockages
 Major repairs and rehabilitation
 De-sludge every 2-4 years
 Monitor effluent
 Optimise unused facilities (communal & 
unconnected simple sewer systems)
 Conduct biogas maintenance
 Deodorise the methane
 De-scum monthly
 Keep records of group assets
 Collect user fees
 Plan & budget for major expenses,  uncertainty, 
emergencies
 Source supplementary income streams
 Manage the treasury book and bank account
 Prepare financial accountability report
 Forecast recurrent costs
 Conduct health campaign
 Remind users of their responsibilities &
provide support
 Conduct monthly users meetings
 Clean the communal systems
 Educate about the benefits of the system
 Host regular management meetings
 Keep complaint recording mechanism
 Pay operator
 Ensure operator legitimacy in community
Successful 
operation
Sustainable 
financing
Sustaining 
demand
Effective 
management
(Source: AKSANSI)
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Key findings: 
3. There are legal, institutional, 
equity, and normative drivers for 
increased LG participation and 
responsibility
37
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Legal drivers 
for increased LG participation and 
responsibility
38
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Legally, local government is responsible.  
According to a review of national law and legislation, 
sanitation is largely missing from national and local 
regulation. 
However, sanitation is described as: 
• A basic service (must be provided by regional 
government)
• Mandatory (every region must carry it out)
• A Concurrent affair (carried out by central + regional 
government)
(Al Afghani et al, 2016) 39
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Legally binding ownership of systems is unclear post 
construction. 
From a technical legal perspective, only a legal entity can 
legally own the assets (land and system). Community 
[‘masyarakat’] and operational CBOs are not legal entities. 
Current asset transfer documentation and processes are 
unlikely to be legally binding.
Treatment
Plant
40
(Figure: T. Rosenqvist)
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Institutional drivers
for increased LG participation and 
responsibility
41
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Expectations as a result 
of LG involvement in 
scheme construction
Expectations that LG 
is guarantor of 
service delivery
Political drive for 
sustainable sanitation from 
national, provincial and 
regional leaders
Inability of CBOs to sustain 
quality local scale services 
in the long term
LG
In the long-term, institutional arrangements put LG in a 
pinch for supporting local scale services
42
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Equity drivers
for increased LG participation and 
responsibility
43
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Voluntary person days
Range (Median) Who pays?
Additional 
Donations
Securing land 25 2 community
Socialisation 4 – 11 2 community
Planning, design, 
oversight, admin 11 – 320 (100) CBO
Construction labour 1070
2
34 – 2,500 (135) 1,3 community
Food, rice from 
community
Median is around 250 days (1 person year) per system
Experienced delivery partners estimate 1500 days (5 person years)
CBO members bear significant load
Voluntary contributions of time from community members 
during construction are significant, especially for 
economically vulnerable people.
Sources:  1 AKSANSI members;  2 BEST;  3 Bogor and Sulawesi CBO workshops and agencies 44
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Land
On‐ allotment 
infrastructure 
‘Socialisation’ (hours)
Desludging
Land Land
On‐ allotment 
infrastructure 
Planning, managing 
construction  (hours)
Socialisation (hours)
On‐ allotment 
infrastructure 
Connection 
fee?
Voluntary labour
(hours)
O+M and 
management (hours)
Voluntary labour
(hours)
O+M
Tariffs Tariffs
Capital  ‐
material and 
labour
Intermittent expenditures  Intermittent expenditures
Facilitators
Planning, managing 
construction 
Consultants / 
supervisors
Capital  ‐ material and labour
Consultants / supervisors
P
r
e
-
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
Planning, managing 
construction 
Materials
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
Onsite system Community (local) system Centralised system
O+M 
Poorer communities are typically asked to contribute more.
Colour code: Government User CBO Community 45
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Poorer	  
communi4es	  may	  
receive	  less	  
capital	  support	  
and	  be	  asked	  to	  
provide	  more.	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O+M	  costs	  are	  
similar	  across	  
scales,	  but	  poorer	  
communi4es	  are	  
expected	  to	  fill	  
the	  revenue-­‐cost	  
gap.	  
Government) User) Community)+)
KSM)
FUNDING 
SOURCE
IDR
)4))))
)5,000))
)10,000))
)15,000))
)20,000))
)25,000))
)30,000))
)35,000))
)40,000))
Local)scale)(MCK))
Bogor)KSM)
Centralised))))
Banjarmasin))
Centralised))))))))))))
Solo)
Centralised))))))
Medan)
MONTHLY)O&M))
(IDR)per)household))
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Monthly COSTS
Costs 
(IDR/month)
Median (range)
Voluntary time
(days/month)
Median (range)
Administration 10 (1-90)
CBO
Operations Operator: 200,000 (30 k – 800 k) 9 (1-75)
community
Consumables
Electricity : 120,000 (50 k – 400 k) 
Goods:         50,000 (10 k – 360 k)
TOTAL
IDR 370,000/ month or 
IDR 6,000/ household/ month
20 days / month
Monthly REVENUE
Fees IDR 5,000/household/month (2 k – 27 k)
Typical user fees are insufficient to meet routine costs. 
Voluntary time equates to one full time worker.
Source: Bogor CBO Workshop. MCK focus. 48
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Normative drivers:
the community empowerment norm 
is changing in practice
49
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community-based sanitation. However, two key features of 
‘community empowerment’ have little relevance in 
practice
1. Behaviour change
SANIMAS original intent: discourage open defecation and encourage 
use of toilets and improved hygiene through Communal systems.
Now, only simple sewer systems (SSS) or mixed (communal/SSS) 
systems are built, not communal.
Where SSS built, people already have toilets. For people with toilets 
and onsite treatment or disposal, the next step is sewerage. For these 
people, SSS costs more in time and money, and provides lower level of 
service than centralised. 
50
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2. Community provides land 
Because most system are now SSS, where all the 
infrastructure can be underground, from 2016, having  land 
is no longer a GoI (Ministry of Public Works) pre-requisite 
for a community to receive a system. 
Local government is now able to provide public land (e.g., 
under roads or other public lands) which creates both a 
need and an opportunity for strengthening LG engagement 
and capacity. 
51
© 
U
T
S
:
I
S
F
Key findings 
4. Some LG already provide financial 
and/or legal support to community or 
local scale sanitation systems, but it is 
not always helpful
52
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In 2014, at least 19 LG were providing financial support, 
mainly for meetings and awards. 
A few supported local system operations with intermittent and asset 
renewal costs e.g., site repairs (~ IDR 170 M); extending communal 
systems to new  house connections (~ IDR 150 M). Some provided 
equipment that could not be used e.g., desludging units that cannot 
reach installed systems.
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Some local governments are developing local legal 
arrangements (eg PERDA) to support sanitation service 
delivery. However, these efforts often discriminate against 
local scale systems. 
Our legal review found existing PERDA:
• Are very focused on separation of roles and responsibilities 
by technology scale (centralised, decentralised, on-site)
• Have many gaps for local scale (objectives, licenses, service 
standards) which makes it hard to achieve accountability
• Refer to CBOs as primarily responsible for planning and 
development, which raises questions of fairness across 
technology scales
54
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Key findings 
5. Local government can fund the 
operation and maintenance phase for 
assets it does not own
55
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• Direct: employee; goods + services
• Indirect: subsidy, grants for legal entities, social 
assistance
There are examples from other areas: the Governor of 
Jakarta funds people and consumables for solid waste 
management in a similar way.
Our legal review and Focus Discussion Groups made clear 
that local governments can potentially use direct and 
indirect expenditure to fund local scale service.
56
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Key findings 
6. Several barriers limit local 
government support
57
© 
U
T
S
:
I
S
F
According to a case study of a City in Java, 4 groups of 
formal and informal factors appear to shape the ability of 
LG to support local scale systems: 
• Unclear rules around public finance and fear of 
sanctions around misuse of public finance
• Unclear legal arrangements for ownership
• Prevalence of the community empowerment norm (e.g. 
communities should manage the systems in order to 
develop self-reliance and capacity)
• Information deficit and disincentive for oversight
58
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• Public financial processes 
are complex, including 
the process for 
determining regional-
level budgets. 
• Most stakeholders had 
little clarity on how to 
use public funds for post-
construction local scale 
support
• Severe sanctions were 
expected for for non-
compliance of public funds.
• This fear discouraged financing
arrangements for local scale 
sanitation in the operation 
phase. 
• It was perceived that allocating 
recurrent expenditure for 
assets not owned by 
government can be treated as 
a criminal offence.
1 2
Unclear rules around public finance
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Unclear legal arrangements for ownership
• Land and asset ownership remains unclear in law
• Grants made by owners and witnessed by various 
officials (e.g. village head) are likely to be legally 
contestable.
• Perception that legal transfer of ownership to the CBO 
could further restrict ability of government funds to be 
allocated to O+M expenditure
60
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Expectations of self –reliance 
(Prevalence of the community empowerment norm)
• Community scale is frequently associated with the 
ideal of ‘community empowerment’. 
• This concept appears to be embedded in a set of 
norms around what the state should and should not 
support.
• Associating a programme or investment with 
‘community empowerment’ has important practical 
ramifications. In particular, it appears to discourage 
routine public spending on post-construction capital 
costs, such as major repairs for local scale facilities. 
61
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52.4
1203342
4.39
9.3
Performance data is
being collected
A B
C
But there is limited
feedback into decision
making (e.g. which
CBOs urgently need
support)
?
Information deficit and disincentive for oversight
• Currently, LG appears to be able to ignore the externalised costs (health impacts of 
ineffective treatment) 
• The scale of system failure is as yet un-quantified and largely invisible – limited sanctions 
from above or complaints from below. Consequently, there are not many personal or 
corporate incentives to invest in addressing a problem which hasn’t yet been widely 
noticed. 
• In this context, it is a ‘low-cost’ option for LG to defer the vast majority of post-
construction responsibilities for services to CBOs. Addressing the factors mentioned above 
(‘allowable actions, control over choice’) would require significant individual effort.
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• LG provides no/minimal support to local scale sustainability:
Continuation of low-level equilibrium/ deterioration of local scale
systems until failure becomes visible and higher level of
government intervenes
• LG provides modest support on those issues which currently seem
‘allowable’: Tinkering with status quo, with a focus on specific
operational responsibilities
• LG takes the initiative to rethink what is ‘allowable’: Seizing
windows of opportunity at the local level to tackle more systemic
issues in the institutional arrangements
Based on this case study, there are three plausible opportunities 
for local government support in the future. 
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Summary of key findings
1. Little monitoring occurs in practice
2. Local scale sanitation service has many challenges in 
practice
3. There are legal, institutional, equity, and normative 
drivers for increased LG participation and responsibility
4. Some LG already provide financial and/or legal support
to local scale sanitation systems, but it is not always 
helpful
5. LG can fund the operation and maintenance phase for 
assets it does not own
6. Several barriers limit LG support
64
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Key recommendations
1. Development clear minimum requirements for LG 
responsibilities for local scale
2. Policies and programs need to reflect all four of 
domains of governance
3. Use simple heuristics like the Pathogen Hazard Diagram 
to help direct investment
4. Use the Governance Spectrum to help LG improve 
governance in their area, based on their local strengths 
and opportunities. 
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Key recommendations
1. Local government takes ultimate responsibility for 
ensuring successful local scale sanitation service 
delivery. 
• National government sets clear minimum 
requirements for local government in this role. 
• Each local government discerns its own path 
beyond these minimum requirements. 
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The 2003 policy created a duality in national policy.
Unfortunately…
• Legal framework favours institution-based systems
• No ownership clarity for CB systems
• Challenges for enforcing CB service standards 
• Equity implications of CBO-management
Institution-based
Water and Sewage
Community-based
Water and Sewage
(Al’Afghani et al 2015) 68
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Local scaleOn-site Centralised
Current ‘common’ understanding of sanitation service scales and 
responsibilities:
(Figure: T. Rosenqvist)
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?
(Figure: T. Rosenqvist)
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The benefits of local scale systems can be realised with 
improved governance models, beyond CBO-led approach.
 Easier to install in existing areas
 Easier to finance
 Simpler to operate
 Less consequences when things go wrong
 Can be connected up as financial and institutional capacity 
improves 
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the following minimum responsibilities for LGs, to ensure all 
systems achieve intended benefits.  
Failing service Successful service
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
L
o
c
a
l
 
s
c
a
l
e
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
s
Push LGs to take 
responsibility for 
improved services 
by:
Proposed Minimum Responsibilities
1. Maintaining post-construction and 
longitudinal records of system location, 
as well as technical and management 
performance
2. Funding major costs e.g. effluent 
monitoring, desludging, rehabilitation, 
extension and retrofitting 
3. Formalising tariff setting and fee 
collection
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Key recommendations
2. Policies and programs need to 
reflect operation phase, including all 
four of domains of governance
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Functioning 
technology: 
Ensuring the physical 
system delivers the 
service
Sustainable financing: 
Sufficient ongoing 
revenue to cover all 
short and long-term 
operational cost 
elements 
Effective management: 
Accountable and  
equitable administration 
and decision making 
system
Sustaining demand: 
Maintaining effective 
community demand for 
the service over time
These four essential, overlapping, and intertwined domains 
spanning the ‘what’ of effective governance are essential 
regardless of which actors are involved and who takes on what 
responsibilities.
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A definition for successful, long term service
Successful governance for sanitation results in 
adequate separation of people from faecal pathogens, 
and environmental protection, through:
• Technology functions
• There is sufficient money to pay for things that need 
to happen
• People continue to use the system
• Management decisions happen and actions follow
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Key recommendations
3. Use simple heuristics like the 
Pathogen Hazard Diagram to help 
direct investment
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Where does it go?
The purpose of sewage management is to separate people 
from excreta, and protect the environment, so we need to 
ask what our technologies are doing:
What pathogens are coming in to the treatment system?
What pathogens are going out?
How much does it matter?
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Three questions for exploring the hazard
A. How many 
pathogens are 
in the influent?
B. How many 
pathogens are 
leaving in treated 
wastes?
C. How much do 
the remaining 
pathogens 
matter?
78
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Influent 
pathogens
(#/day)
3. Periodic 
sludge 
removal
1. Leakage or 
leachate
What is the 
minimum 
infective dosec
Potential hazard:
# doses in treated 
wastes?
bacteria 102 - 108 ?
viruses 100 - 101 ?
protozoa 100 - 102 ?
helminth
eggs 10
0 - 101 ?
A. How many 
pathogens are 
in the influent?
B. How many 
pathogens are leaving 
in treated wastes (1, 
2, 3)?
2. Piped 
treated 
liquid 
effluentThe boundary 
of the septic 
tank 
(Mitchell et al 2016, Waterlines)
Treated 
wastes 
pathogens
(#/day)
How to determine if further treatment is needed: 
C. How much do the remaining 
pathogens matter:
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The significance of numbers: two representations of “99% 
removal of daily helminth production from infected 
individual”.  
a)    106
0
Arithmetic representation
5 x 105
1,000,000
750,000
500,000
250,000
0
99% removal
b)  106
104
102
100
Logarithmic representation
100
1
1,000,000
10,000
99% removal
(Mitchell et al 2016, Waterlines) 80
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(#/day)
1010 bact.
1011 virus
107 protz
106 helmth
0-2 log removal a
108 – 109 bacteriaa
1010 virus particlesa,b
106 protozoaa
105 helminthsa
3. Periodic sludge 
removal
a After Feachem et al, 1983
b Leclerc et al, 2002
c See Table 1 in text
1. No leakage 
or leachate
Minimum 
infective 
dosec
Potential 
hazard
(# doses)
bacteria 102 - 108 Up to 107
viruses 100 - 101 Up to 1010
protozoa 100 - 102 Up to 106
helminth
eggs 10
0 - 101 Up to 105
Influent
Treated 
wastes (1,2,3)
2. Piped treated 
liquid effluent
The boundary of the 
septic tank 
Pathogen Hazard Diagram could help work out what matters, 
using only textbook data e.g. sealed septic tank with no 
secondary treatment
(Mitchell et al 2016, Waterlines) 81
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Key recommendations
4. Use the Governance Spectrum to 
help LG improve governance in their 
area, based on their local strengths 
and opportunities. 
82
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Local governments have widely differing capacities. 
• With respect to human excreta management, local 
governments have widely differing capacities (such as 
knowledge, resources, institutional arrangements) and 
attitudes to sanitation, and operate in widely differing 
contexts. 
• Assessing this variation is challenging because it hinges 
on local individuals and local institutional 
arrangements: two cities may have the same level of 
documentation (e.g. City Sanitation Plan) but quite 
different levels of sophistication in local arrangements.  
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The research revealed a spectrum of governance. 
CBO-led Co-management Institution-led
Each box represents a different set of players 
and different type of effort
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CBO-led Co-management Institution-led
Formalising 
PPPS
Assigning risk-
based 
responsibilities
Collaboratively 
assigning
responsibilities 
Building 
network a 
network of 
support
Strengthening 
CBOs
Co-management 
with LG
Authority in 
tariff setting 
and fee 
collection
Matching 
innovative 
financing to 
need
Building 
innovation 
entrepreneurs
The governance spectrum and ‘toolbox’
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It’s like a toolbox….One Local Government might try these 
approaches based on their needs and strengths.
CBO-led Co-management Institution-led
Formalising 
PPPS
Assigning risk-
based 
responsibilities
Collaboratively 
assigning
responsibilities 
Co-
management 
with LG
Strengthening 
CBOs
Building 
networks
Authority in 
tariff setting 
and fee 
collection
Matching 
innovative 
financing to 
need
Building 
innovation 
entrepreneurs
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It’s like a toolbox….Another Local Government might try these 
approaches based on their needs and strengths.
CBO-led Co-management Institution-led
Formalising 
PPPS
Assigning risk-
based 
responsibilities
Collaboratively 
assigning
responsibilities 
Co-
management 
with LG
Strengthening 
CBOs
Building 
networks
Authority in 
tariff setting 
and fee 
collection
Matching 
innovative 
financing to 
need
Building 
innovation 
entrepreneurs
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KEY MESSAGE
The best approach is 
working out what fits 
in your context. 
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CBO-led
Co-management
Institution-led
As part of our project and training, we developed a game to help local 
governments and CBOs explore different governance arrangements.
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Institution-led
Formalising 
public / 
private 
partnerships
Collaboratively 
assigning 
responsibilities
Assigning risk-
based 
responsibilities
90
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Institution-led
Collaboratively 
assigning 
responsibilities
Stakeholders? 
• LG
• Mayor
• NGOs
• Users
• etc
Responsibilities?
• Desludging
• Fee collection
• Monitoring & 
corrective action
• Major repairs
• etc
How can these be linked appropriately 
based on the unique context in each 
space? 
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Institution-led
Formalising 
public / 
private 
partnerships
How can duty-bearers formalise O&M 
entity from the beginning?
• Build – own - operate (Blitar City)
• Build-operate-transfer  
• Build – own – operate – transfer
• Lease / purchase
Engage private or public post‐
construction service providers:
• LG service delivery agency, BLUD
• LG-owned company, BUMD
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Institution-led
Assigning risk-
based 
responsibilities
If the goal is to reduce risk, who would 
do what? How would risk be defined? 
“If I were mayor, the only thing that 
would move me would be risk”
Ministry of Planning representative
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Case study of management based on risk – US EPA
Responsible Management 
Entity (RME) framework 
assigns responsibility 
based on risk to ensure 
decentralised sewage 
project’s health and envt
in long-term
Management models
1. Homeowner awareness
2. Maintenance contracts
3. Operating permits
4. RME O+M
5. RME Ownership
94
© 
U
T
S
:
I
S
F
Co-management via partnerships
Strengthening 
CBOs
Co-
management
Building 
networks
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Co-management
Strengthening 
CBOs
• Formalise entities (cooperative, 
association, village-owned 
enterprise) (see Al Afghani 2015)
• Provide template and training for 
business model  / work plan, as 
opposed to a volunteer plan (see 
Business Model Canvas)
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CBOs could legally incorporate as (see Al Afghani 2015): 
• Association
• Limited liability company
• Village business entity (BUM Desa)
• Foundation
• Cooperative
• No legal entity is perfect
• Cooperatives and associations would be easiest
• Multiple CBOs could be amalgamated into a single legal 
entity at District or City level to simplify paper and 
procedure (but this also increases complexity) 97
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Co-management
Co-
management 
with LG
How can LG provide support for:
• Oversight
• Major repair
• Monitoring
• Training
• Incentives (awards)
• Legally securing the land
• Regulation
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Co-management
Building 
regional and 
national  
networks
Why: 
• Coordination across districts
• Achieve benefits of aggregating
Examples:
• AKSANSI national organisation 
(organisation supporting CBOs for sanitation)
• Brantas Watershed partnership 
(agreement among 16 LGs to address sanitation 
to improve the watershed)
• East Java association
(regional community of practice for CBOs)
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CBO-led
Authority in 
tariff setting 
and fee 
collection
Matching 
innovative 
financing to 
need
Building 
innovation 
entrepreneurs
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CBO-led
Authority in 
tariff setting 
and fee 
collection
Formalise fee levels: 
• Who currently sets fees and how much 
authority do they have? 
• Who has enough authority to set higher 
fees and incentivise users to pay?
Fee collection: 
• Who currently collects fees?  
• If a community member, what if someone 
else, with authority, collected the fee?  
What could that look like?  Who could that 
be?
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A vicious circle exists with financial failure.
CBOs cannot 
collect sufficient 
revenue
CBOs do 
not have 
highly 
technical 
expertise
Unhappy 
users and 
CBO
CBO can’t pay 
operator
System and 
service 
declines
CBOs have no authority in 
fee collection or fee 
setting
CBO can’t 
undertake 
major repair
CBO loses 
interest and 
motivation
Lost 
investment Decreased health & 
env’t outcomes 102
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One suggestion is to create authority in tariff setting and fee 
collection. It can improve operational success in several ways.
Authority in 
tariff setting 
and fee 
collection
Increased hh
connections
Increased fee 
collection
Increase 
effluent into 
collection 
chamber 
Improved 
maintenance
Operational 
success
Extend 
main pipe
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CBO-led
Matching 
innovative 
financing to 
need
Need/Opportunity
• Additional household connections 
connections
• Major repair
• Retrofitting communal to hybrid
• Revenue generation
Innovative financing
• Micro-finance
• Credit cooperative
• Arisan (pooling of community funds)
• Corporate social responsibility 104
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These simple interventions could be funded in a variety of ways.
What is the value of the optimisation gap and who could 
pay? 
Necessary incremental 
amount needed to 
optimise the existing 
investment
Initial 425.000.000 IDR  
invested to construct the 
decentralised system
Optimisation gap
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CBO-led
Building 
innovation 
entrepreneurs
• Renting additional stalls
• Micro-loans for fisherman
• Catfish ponds
• Fertiliser
• Services for others (desludging)
• Cassava and banana fields
• Biogas
106
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CBO-led Co-management Institution-led
Formalising 
PPPS
Assigning risk-
based 
responsibilities
Collaboratively 
assigning
responsibilities 
Co-
management 
with LG
Strengthening 
CBOs
Building 
networks
Authority in 
tariff setting 
and fee 
collection
Matching 
innovative 
financing to 
need
Building 
innovation 
entrepreneurs
The governance spectrum and ‘toolbox’
For more detail see: Ross et al 2016 107
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Summary of key recommendations
1. Develop clear minimum requirements for LG 
responsibilities for local scale
2. Policies and programs need to reflect all four of 
domains of governance
3. Use simple heuristics like the Pathogen Hazard Diagram 
to help direct investment
4. Use the Governance Spectrum to help LG improve 
governance in their area, based on their local strengths 
and opportunities. 
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Other supporting 
recommendations
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Specific next steps for national policy and programs:
• Develop SPM (minimum service standard) for 
sanitation and advocate for national sanitation 
regulation
• Modify program guidelines to (1) include minimum LG 
responsibilities and (2) require post-construction checks 
for all systems, to be recorded locally and in the 
national database (NAWASIS).
• Consider cross-program evaluation to embed the 
lessons (e.g. if unexpected costs arise during 
construction, all for the request of additional funds to 
build the system as designed). 110
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Specific next steps for national policy and programs:
• Use the outcomes of our legal review to draft and 
implement local regulations to specify minimum LG 
responsibilities for all scales of sanitation and required 
performance of the systems; and leave open how other 
responsibilities are distributed among qualified, registered 
entities in the future (i.e., sanitation services in line with co-
management and institution-led).
• Develop a National Expenditure Policy to clarify how LG can 
financially support Operation of local scale, regardless of 
ownership.
• Explore guidance for LG to either take on asset ownership 
or facilitate the highest form of land ownership for CBOs 111
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Specific next steps for supporting LG:
• Support LG to coordinate information and monitoring for 
improving efficacy of resource use and demonstrate 
performance. Create positive incentives for monitoring.
• Strengthen links between site selection and need: 
Explore potential guidance for LG to use the Pathogen 
Hazard Diagram to identify real risks from existing 
sanitation systems, including cesspits (cubluks) and 
identify where to locate SSS systems to reduce pathogen 
exposure risk.
• Create guidance for LG to help optimize existing 
investments (quick strategy to double coverage)
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